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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
(HEARD MAY 31, 2019, AT KNOXVILLE) 
 
Jason Rhodes )    Docket No. 2018-01-0349  
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 33747-2018 
 ) 
Amazon.com, LLC, et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge ) 
 
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded 
 
The employee, a picker at the employer’s warehouse facility, injured his foot when a box 
fell on it while at work.  He was provided a panel of physicians and was later referred to a 
specialist by the physician he chose from the panel.  The employee did not attend his 
appointment with the specialist because he felt the location was too far from his home.  
Instead, he obtained unauthorized treatment from a different specialist and filed a petition 
seeking medical benefits in the form of a panel of specialists or authorization to treat with 
his own specialist.  He also sought temporary disability benefits.  The trial court, while 
finding the specialist to whom the employee had been referred was in his community for 
purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i), ordered the 
employer to provide a panel of specialists after determining the employer had violated the 
spirit of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii) by directing the 
treating physician to refer the employee to a specific specialist.  The trial court also 
awarded temporary disability benefits.  The employer has appealed.  Having carefully 
reviewed the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case. 
 
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.  Judge David F. Hensley concurred in part and 
dissented in part. 
 
W. Troy Hart and Tiffany B. Sherrill, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, 
Amazon.com, LLC 
 
Tim O. Henshaw, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Jason Rhodes 
 
FILED
Jun 11, 2019
02:25 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
2 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
    
Jason Rhodes (“Employee”) worked as a picker for Amazon.com, LLC 
(“Employer”), at its Chattanooga location.  Employee injured his left foot on April 17, 
2018, when a box fell and struck his foot.  He was treated at Employer’s onsite clinic and 
was provided a panel of physicians from which he chose AFC Urgent Care. 
  
The next day, April 18, 2018, at Employee’s first appointment with AFC Urgent 
Care, Dr. Natasha Ballard performed an exam and ordered x-rays of Employee’s foot, 
which did not reveal a fracture or any swelling.  Dr. Ballard diagnosed Employee with a 
contusion and released him to work with restrictions.  She also instructed him to wear an 
open-toed boot.  According to Employee, he went back to work later that day and was 
told he could not work with the boot.  Employee testified that he returned to work for his 
next scheduled shift on April 22, 2018, and was informed he had been terminated. 
 
Employee saw Dr. Ballard again four days after his injury and informed her that 
he could not put pressure on his foot.  Dr. Ballard ordered additional x-rays, which did 
not reveal the cause of his complaints, and she prescribed an anti-inflammatory and 
increased Employee’s restrictions.  At a subsequent appointment, Employee complained 
of continuing problems, and Dr. Ballard ordered testing to rule out neuropathy, which 
came back within normal limits.  Unable to identify the cause of Employee’s persistent 
pain, Dr. Ballard extended the duration of his restrictions and referred him to Dr. Ricky 
Hutcheson, an orthopedic surgeon in Cleveland, Tennessee, for further evaluation.  When 
asked why she referred Employee to Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Ballard stated: 
 
Dr. Hutcheson had just been, since we got the Amazon account, the kind of 
preferred physician for Amazon, just we were told that, you know, for 
orthopedic we prefer Dr. Hutcheson.  Historically, it has been to – a lot of 
companies do this to get them in to see someone faster as opposed to a 
general panel.  It just depends on the employer.  Even though we are in a 
panel state, it depends on the employer and particularly their preference.  
Some employers or case managers prefer certain physicians over others.  
Typically we do that just to help speed up the process, so they can get in to 
see someone sooner. 
 
When asked if anyone told her that she had to make referrals of Amazon 
employees to Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Ballard stated “[t]hat was told to us . . . when we first 
started the account. . . . When we first got that, he had given us something that they 
wanted referrals to Dr. Hutcheson.  So we’ve just kept that going ever since.”  When 
asked if there was any medical reason why she made a specific referral to Dr. Hutcheson, 
Dr. Ballard responded: 
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Medically, no.  No.  It was just – Amazon would just prefer to send to Dr. 
Hutcheson.  In my mind I’m doing it because it’s typically faster, again, to 
get them – if we’ve got a specific doctor, typically that’s been our 
experience, that you can get in faster, as opposed to presented with a 
general panel and then they have time to decide between physicians who to 
go see.  As far as I know, it’s been to help facilitate a speedier follow-up for 
patients. 
 
Employer scheduled an appointment for Employee with Dr. Hutcheson, which he 
did not attend because he felt it was too far to drive.  Dr. Hutcheson’s office was 
approximately twenty-five miles from Employee’s home. 
 
Employee ultimately sought medical treatment with his own orthopedic physician, 
Dr. Jesse Doty, who diagnosed him with a foot strain.  Dr. Doty recommended Employee 
continue wearing his boot and that he be released with no restrictions after completing 
four weeks of restricted duty.  Employee remained out of work from April 22, 2018, until 
June 2, 2018, when he began working as a security guard for a different employer some 
six weeks after his injury. 
 
When asked whether Employee’s injury was work-related, Dr. Doty stated that, 
assuming Employee’s history was credible, his injury “could have been caused by the 
work-related accident that he described.”  When asked how Employer’s preference for a 
certain doctor might affect the physician/patient relationship, Dr. Doty stated: 
 
I think these relationships occur all the time where employers have a 
relationship with a physician and generally the injured employee starts out 
with that physician for their overall history, physical and evaluation.  But I 
don’t think that has anything to do with whether it’s in the patient’s best 
interest.  I think those are formidable relationships which are standard with 
a lot of companies. 
 
When asked why he made referrals to specific doctors, Dr. Doty responded that he 
sometimes “refer[s] based on feedback from case managers . . . because [he] know[s] 
there are certain physicians that they work with and have relationships with.”  He further 
explained, “[i]f the patient doesn’t have a preference, then I’ll ask the case manager do 
you have a preference for the referring physician.”  Dr. Doty confirmed that receiving a 
recommendation for the physician referral makes it easier to recommend a physician who 
accepts workers’ compensation patients. 
 
Procedural History 
 
Employee filed a petition seeking medical and temporary disability benefits.  At 
an expedited hearing, Employee clarified that he was seeking medical treatment in the 
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form of either a panel of orthopedic physicians or authorization to treat with Dr. Doty, as 
well as temporary disability benefits from April 22, 2018, through June 1, 2018.  
Employee asserted Dr. Hutcheson was outside his community, and thus he should not be 
required to see him.  Employee also argued that by directing Dr. Ballard to refer its 
workers to Dr. Hutcheson, Employer had usurped his right to select his treating 
physician. 
 
In response, Employer maintained that it had complied with the law by providing 
an initial panel of physicians and then by accepting Dr. Ballard’s referral to Dr. 
Hutcheson.  Employer also asserted it had no obligation to provide additional medical 
treatment after Employee refused medical treatment with Dr. Hutcheson.  Finally, 
Employer argued it did not owe temporary disability benefits because Employee refused 
to treat with Dr. Hutcheson and because he had been terminated for cause. 
 
The trial court found that Employee would likely prevail at trial in proving his 
entitlement to see an orthopedist other than Dr. Hutcheson and in proving his entitlement 
to temporary disability benefits from April 22, 2018, through June 1, 2018.  Specifically, 
the court found that insisting Employee see a physician located twenty-five miles from 
his home was not sufficiently inconvenient to exclude Dr. Hutcheson as an appropriate 
physician under the community standard in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
204(a)(3)(A)(i).  However, the court found that by directing Dr. Ballard to refer 
employees to Dr. Hutcheson, Employer “remove[d] the treating physician’s neutrality by 
compelling referral to a specific specialist.”  In so doing, the court determined Employer 
failed to comply with the spirit of the referral statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 
50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii).  Consequently, the court ordered Employer to provide a panel of 
orthopedists.  Finally, the court found that Employee was entitled to temporary disability 
benefits for approximately six weeks, from his termination on April 22, 2018, to his last 
day of unemployment on June 1, 2018.  Employer has appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2018).  When the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.  Madden v. Holland 
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).  However, “[n]o similar 
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”  
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at 
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018).  Similarly, the interpretation and 
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with 
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions.  See Mansell v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013).  We are 
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also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a 
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2018). 
 
Analysis 
 
Employer raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether Employee is entitled to a 
panel of specialists; (2) whether Employee is entitled to medical and temporary disability 
benefits after refusing to comply with the medical treatment offered by Employer; and (3) 
whether Employee is entitled to temporary disability benefits following his termination.  
For his part, Employee assigns error to the trial court’s determination that Dr. Hutcheson 
was not located sufficiently far away from his residence as to conflict with the 
community standard in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i).  He also 
asserts that this appeal is frivolous and, therefore, he should be awarded attorney’s fees.  
We address each issue in turn. 
 
The Community Standard 
 
We begin with Employee’s argument that Dr. Hutcheson’s office, located twenty-
five miles from Employee’s home, was outside his community.  The trial court was not 
persuaded, and neither are we. 
 
An employer must “designate a group of three (3) or more independent reputable 
physicians . . . if available in the injured employee’s community . . . from which the 
injured employee shall select one (1) to be the treating physician.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i)  (emphasis added).  Additionally, “when necessary, the treating 
physician selected in accordance with this subdivision (a)(3)(A) shall make referrals to a 
specialist physician.”  Id.  When such a referral is made, “[t]he employer shall be deemed 
to have accepted the referral, unless the employer, within three (3) business days, 
provides the employee a panel of three (3) or more independent reputable 
physicians . . . .”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
Interestingly, the community requirement in section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) does not 
appear in the referral provision of section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii).  To the extent the 
community requirement applies to referrals at all, the trial court correctly pointed out that 
the parties have not provided, nor have the courts identified, a definition of “the injured 
employee’s community” as that phrase is used in section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i).   Although 
the workers’ compensation scheme references “community” in other statutory provisions 
relating to medical benefits, the statutes do not include a definition of “in the injured 
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employee’s community” for purposes of section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i).1  Thus, we agree 
with the trial court that such disputes should be decided in light of the totality of the 
circumstances of each particular case. 
 
Here, the trial court ruled that, while Dr. Hutcheson’s location twenty-five miles 
from Employee’s home may have been inconvenient to Employee, the inconvenience was 
not sufficient to place Dr. Hutcheson outside Employee’s community for the purpose of 
serving as his authorized physician.  The evidence does not preponderate against this 
conclusion.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Dr. Hutcheson was 
located within Employee’s community. 
 
Direct Referral2 
 
A. 
 
Employer argues Employee is not entitled to a panel of specialists because 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii) provides for direct referrals and 
it complied with the statute when it accepted Dr. Ballard’s referral and scheduled an 
appointment with Dr. Hutcheson instead of providing a panel.  Employee responds that 
injured workers always have the right to select a treating physician from a panel, even 
when there is a direct referral accepted by an employer in accordance with section 
(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
Whether an employee may always insist on a panel of physicians in the context of 
a direct referral, and thereby trump an employer’s statutory right to elect whether to 
accept the referral or provide a panel, is an issue of first impression.  There are several 
statutory provisions pertinent to this important issue.  First, Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) requires an employer to provide injured workers “such medical 
and surgical treatment . . . as ordered by the attending physician . . . made reasonably 
necessary by accident as defined in this chapter.”  Second, workers are required to 
“accept the medical benefits afforded under this section; provided that in any case when 
the employee has suffered an injury and expressed a need for medical care, the employer 
shall designate a group of three (3) or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., section 50-6-204(a)(3)(B) (if three specialists do not practice in the employee’s community, 
the employer can include specialists within a radius of 125 miles); section 50-6-204(j)(2)(A) (the 
employer can include on a panel pain management physicians within a 175 mile radius of employee’s 
residence or place of employment); and section 50-6-204(a)(6)(A) (providing for mileage reimbursement 
if the employee must drive more than thirty miles roundtrip for treatment). 
 
2 The dissent argues we have somehow adopted a “new legal term,” direct referral, a phrase used by the 
trial court.  To be clear, we simply use that innocuous phrase to describe a situation where one physician 
refers a patient to another physician, an example of which is described in section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
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chiropractors or specialty practice groups . . . from which the injured employee shall 
select one (1) to be the treating physician.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 
In addition, there are statutory provisions regarding medical referrals.  Pertinent to 
this case, section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii) states that, when appropriate, a “treating 
physician selected in accordance with this subdivision (a)(3)(A) shall make referrals to a 
specialist physician, surgeon, or chiropractor and immediately notify the employer.”  
When such a referral is made, “[t]he employer shall be deemed to have accepted the 
referral, unless the employer, within three (3) business days, provides the employee a 
panel of three (3) or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons, chiropractors or 
specialty practice groups.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii).  In cases where the 
employer does provide a panel, “the employee may choose a specialist, physician, 
surgeon, chiropractor or specialty practice group to provide treatment only from the panel 
provided by the employer.”  Id. 
 
The statutory scheme thus contemplates direct referrals to specialists and provides 
employers the option of accepting the referral or, instead, providing a panel of specialists.  
The statutes are silent as to whether an employee can demand a second panel after the 
employer accepts the referral from the first panel physician.  The referral statute also does 
not impose specific criteria on the treating physician’s selection of a specialist.  
Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Ballard’s rationale for referring Employee to Dr. 
Hutcheson and Employer’s acceptance of the referral do not violate section 50-6-
204(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
B. 
 
The issue then becomes whether the trial court’s ordering a panel of specialists, 
based on what it referred to as Employer’s violation of the “spirit” of the referral statute, 
rather than the actual statutory language itself, was appropriate and within its authority.  
We hold it was not. 
 
The trial court’s decision hinges on its determination that an “an employer fails to 
comply with the spirit of the direct referral statute when it removes the treating 
physician’s neutrality by compelling referral to a specific specialist.”  In so doing, the 
court reasoned Employer violated the referral law by usurping the employee’s “privilege” 
of selecting his treating physician.  Yet, our research reveals that in cases citing this 
“privilege” language, including the case relied upon by the trial court, Ducros v. Metro 
Roofing and Metal Supply Co., Inc., No. 2017-01-0228, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. 
LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 17, 2017), the courts have affirmed an 
employee’s right to select the initial treating physician from a panel.  We have found no 
case in which this right has been extended to an employee’s choice of a referral 
physician. 
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First, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s consideration of the “privilege” language 
itself traces back to a case decided more than forty years ago, Employers Insurance of 
Wausau v. Carter, 522 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1975).  In Wausau, the injured worker was 
referred to the company doctor for treatment instead of being provided an initial panel of 
physicians.  Unsatisfied with the company doctor’s treatment, the employee sought 
treatment on her own and was later awarded medical and disability benefits.  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, highlighting the employer’s failure 
to provide an initial panel of physicians.  The Court cited the initial panel provision in 
force at the time, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1004, which stated an employee 
shall accept the offered medical treatment “provided, that the employer shall designate a 
group of three (3) or more reputable physicians or surgeons . . . from which the injured 
employee shall have the privilege of selecting the operating surgeon or the attending 
physician.”  Id. at 176 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court went on to explain that 
 
[t]his statute authorizes the employer to choose a panel of three physicians, 
but the employee is given the privilege to make the final choice of the 
attending physician from the panel of three. . . .  Referring the employee to 
a single physician does not comply with the statute; it is an usurpation of 
the privilege of the employee to choose the ultimate treating physician. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  At no point did the Court in Wausau, or any court since, apply this 
privilege to the situation in which an initial panel physician made a referral to a specialist, 
the situation presented by the instant case.  In fact, Wausau did not involve a referral at 
all, and the “privilege” language no longer appears in the statute.  Thus, while Employee 
relies on Wausau in his brief, that case does not control the issue in the case before us.  In 
the absence of any statutory language directing or permitting us to do so, we are unable to 
expand this “privilege” to enable an employee to essentially negate an employer’s 
statutory right to accept a direct referral, a right expressly granted to it by the legislature.3 
 
Second, our resolution of this issue is consistent with an important public policy 
underlying the workers’ compensation system in general, namely, an employer’s right to 
control medical treatment.  While it is true that an employee may choose his or her initial 
treating physician, “Tennessee courts have long held that the employer in a workers’ 
compensation case generally has the right to control medical treatment, assuming that the 
employer has complied with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
6-204.”  Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. 
                                                 
3 Parenthetically, we note that, prior to the 2013 reforms, the law contemplated situations in which a panel 
would not be required prior to an employer’s providing medical care.  Specifically, Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(7) stated that, when the injury required “specialized medical attention” 
that was not available in the worker’s community, “the injured employee can be required to go, at the 
request of and at the expense of the employer, to the nearest location at which the specialized medical 
attention is available.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(d)(7)(2012).  That language remains unaltered by 
the 2013 Reform Act. 
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App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015); see also 
Banks v. UPS, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tenn. 2005) (discussing the employer’s “right 
to control the provision of treatment”); Todd v. Blvd. Terrace Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., 
LLC, No. M2003-01357-WC-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 358, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ 
Comp. Panel Apr. 30, 2004) (a delay in reporting the injury prejudiced the employer’s 
right to control the medical treatment).  Here, Employer complied with the express 
requirements of the applicable statutes by providing an initial panel of physicians and by 
accepting that physician’s direct referral.  Accordingly, it has preserved its right to 
control medical treatment. 
 
Third, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(E) states that “[i]n all 
cases where the treating physician has referred the employee to a specialist . . . the 
specialist . . . to which the employee has been referred, or selected by the employee from 
a panel provided by the employer, shall become the treating physician.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  If, as argued by Employee and our dissenting colleague, workers are always 
entitled to a panel upon a direct referral, the first clause of this statute – “to which the 
employee has been referred” – would be meaningless.  Indeed, if this interpretation was 
correct and workers were always entitled to a panel of physicians, there would be no need 
for section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii) at all.  The law is clear that statutes should be 
interpreted “so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.”  Azbill 
v. Azbill, 661 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).  While our dissenting colleague 
would effectively revise the pertinent statutes by reading rights into them that are not 
there and, in the process nullify certain provisions, we have refrained from doing so. 
 
Fourth, we are not unmindful of Employer’s purported influence on Dr. Ballard’s 
referral decision-making.  However, directing employers’ actions in a manner not 
currently mandated by statute is best left to the legislature, not the courts.4  Similarly, 
Employee’s argument that employers exercise too much control over medical treatment is 
a policy argument best addressed to the legislature, which has the authority to alter or 
remove the direct referral provisions of the law.  We have no such authority.5 
                                                 
4 We note that the designation “treating physician” as used in section 204(a)(3)(A)(i) is not a defined 
term, and the statutes treat authorized treating physicians differently in different contexts.  For example, 
in section 50-6-102(14)(E), in order for the causation opinion of a “treating physician” to be entitled to a 
presumption of correctness, that physician must have been “selected by the employee from the 
employer’s designated panel of physicians.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E) (2018).  Thus, an 
employer or its insurer takes a significant risk by instructing its panel physicians to make direct referrals 
to specific physicians since the causation opinion of such a referral physician is not entitled to a 
presumption of correctness. 
 
5 The policy arguments made by the dissent, while appropriate for the legislature to consider, do not 
enable us to read into the statutes a right or obligation not supported by a fair reading of the plain 
language of the statutes.  Our role is to apply the statutes as written and go no further.  See Rush v. Great 
Am. Ins. Co., 376 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Tenn. 1964) (“The primary function of this Court is to interpret and 
apply the law to given situations.  To legislate is wholly foreign to our duty.”). 
10 
 
Finally, it is important to note that, unlike in times past when courts were called 
upon to interpret and apply the workers’ compensation statutes remedially in favor of 
injured workers, our actions are now limited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
116.  That statute mandates that the law “shall not be remedially or liberally construed 
but shall be construed fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of 
statutory construction[,] and this chapter shall not be construed in a manner favoring 
either the employee or the employer.”6  See Willis v. All Staff, No. M2016-01143-SC-R3-
WC, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 455, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Aug. 3, 2017).  
Awarding employees a panel of specialists where that right is not set out in the plain 
language of the statutes strikes of a remedial interpretation of the law in favor of one side, 
if not assuming a policy role best left to others, which our workers’ compensation scheme 
now prohibits. 
 
In short, after an initial panel of physicians is offered and an authorized physician 
is selected, that physician has the discretion to make a referral to a specialist.  Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii).  If the employer does not want to accept that referral, it can 
offer the employee a panel of specialists.  Id.  However, there is nothing in the statutes 
that compels an employer to offer a panel of specialists any time there is a direct referral.  
Stated differently, there is no authority that enables an employee to negate an employer’s 
statutory ability to accept a direct referral by insisting on a panel of specialists in every 
case.  Unlike the dissent, we are persuaded that, if such a right should exist, it should be 
created by the legislature, not judges.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order to 
the extent it finds Employer must provide a panel of orthopedists, and instead conclude 
that Dr. Hutcheson is the treating physician. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In McClendon v. Food Lion, LLC, No. E2013-00380-WC-R3-WC, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. Panel July 11, 2014), the employee suffered a compensable injury to her shoulder and 
was provided an initial panel of physicians from which she chose an orthopedic surgeon.  When that 
physician retired, she requested a new panel, from which she selected a neurosurgeon.  Employee became 
unhappy with her new physician’s treatment and requested a panel of orthopedic surgeons, asserting an 
orthopedic surgeon was more qualified to treat her shoulder injury.  The trial court ordered a new panel of 
orthopedic surgeons.  On appeal, the employer argued the trial court lacked authority to order another 
panel because Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 did not explicitly authorize a trial court to do 
so.  The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding “[w]hile courts may not amend, alter, or 
extend the provisions of the Act beyond its obvious meaning, it is well within the spirit of the workers’ 
compensation law to ensure that an appropriate panel of physicians who are qualified to treat a particular 
injury is provided to an employee. . . . Since the workers’ compensation statute should be liberally 
construed in favor of compensation and any doubts should be resolved in the employee’s favor, we do not 
read section 50-6-204 or any other provision as precluding the trial court in this case from ordering 
Employer to provide a new panel of orthopaedic specialists.”  Id. at *13 (citations omitted).  Importantly, 
McClendon arose prior to the effective date of the Reform Act of 2013, and the order for a new panel was 
expressly based on a remedial interpretation of pre-reform law. 
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Noncompliance with Medical Treatment 
 
Employer next challenges its obligation to provide medical benefits in light of 
Employee’s alleged medical noncompliance.  Specifically, Employer argues that by 
failing to attend his scheduled appointment with Dr. Hutcheson, Employee refused the 
provided medical treatment and forfeited his entitlement to further benefits. 
 
In Tennessee, when an employee “refuses to comply with any reasonable request 
for examination or to accept the medical or specialized medical services that the 
employer is required to furnish . . ., the injured employee’s right to compensation shall be 
suspended and no compensation shall be due and payable while the injured employee 
continues to refuse.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(d)(8).  Our Supreme Court has long 
interpreted this provision to mean that “in circumstances where an employee is 
noncompliant with medical treatment, ‘compensation shall be held in abeyance, not 
terminated.’”  Newell v. Metro Carpets, LLC, No. 2015-05-0091, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 57, at *4-5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 28, 2016) (citing 
Blevins v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co., 144 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tenn. 1940)). 
 
As previously discussed, Employer provided the medical services it was required 
to furnish under the law by accepting Dr. Ballard’s referral to Dr. Hutcheson and 
scheduling an appointment for Employee.  Employee testified that his decision not to 
attend his appointment was based on his belief that it was too far from his home.  As the 
trial court found, and as we have affirmed, Dr. Hutcheson was located in Employee’s 
community.  Thus, Employee’s refusal to attend his May 10, 2018 appointment with Dr. 
Hutcheson based on location was unreasonable, and Employer appropriately suspended 
his right to compensation as provided in section 50-6-204(d)(8). 
 
Because Employee refused treatment with Dr. Hutcheson on May 10, 2018, and 
has continued to refuse authorized treatment since that time, the trial court’s award of 
benefits on and after May 10, 2018 was error.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s 
decision to award temporary disability benefits between May 10, 2018 and June 1, 2018. 
 
Termination for Cause 
 
As its third basis of error, Employer argues Employee is not entitled to temporary 
disability benefits after April 22, 2018 because he was terminated for cause.  Employer 
asserts that Employee did not show up or call in for his scheduled shifts after his injury 
and was thus fired for abandoning his job. 
 
An injured worker is eligible for temporary disability benefits if (1) the worker 
became disabled from working due to a compensable injury, (2) there is a causal 
connection between the injury and the inability to work, and (3) the worker established 
the duration of the period of disability.  Albright v. Hercules HVAC Pads, Inc., No. 2018-
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01-0109, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 66, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. 
Bd. Dec. 20, 2018).  A worker is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits, a 
category of vocational disability distinct from temporary total disability, when the 
temporary disability is not total.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)-(2).  Specifically, 
while temporary total disability refers to the employee’s condition while completely 
unable to work because of the injury until the worker recovers as far as the nature of the 
injury permits, “[t]emporary partial disability refers to the time, if any, during which the 
injured employee is able to resume some gainful employment but has not reached 
maximum recovery.”  Williams v. Saturn Corp., No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 
Tenn. LEXIS 1032, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 15, 2005). 
 
Even though an employee has a work-related injury for which temporary benefits 
are payable, the employer is entitled to enforce workplace rules.  See Carter v. First 
Source Furniture Grp., 92 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tenn. 2002).  Thus, an employee’s 
termination due to a violation of a workplace rule may relieve an employer of its 
obligation to pay temporary disability benefits if the termination was related to the 
workplace violation.  See Marvin Windows of Tenn., Inc. v. Gardner, No. W2011-01479-
WC-R3-WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 403, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 8, 2012).   
An employer will not be penalized for enforcing a rule or policy if the court determines 
“(1) that the actions allegedly precipitating the employee’s dismissal qualified as 
misconduct under established or ordinary workplace rules and/or expectations; and (2) 
that those actions were, as a factual matter, the true motivation for the dismissal.”  
Durham v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. E2008-00708-WC-R3-WC, 2009 
Tenn. LEXIS 3, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 5, 2009). 
 
Here, while Employer asserts in its brief that Employee did not return to work 
despite Employer’s ability to accommodate his restrictions and that Employee was 
terminated for abandoning his job on April 22, 2018, Employer has not provided any 
testimony or other evidence to support its allegation that Employee failed to return to 
work as scheduled.7  By contrast, Employee testified that he returned to work for his next 
scheduled work day on April 22, 2018, and an Employer representative told him without 
explanation that he had been terminated.  The trial court heard Employee’s testimony and 
apparently believed him.  In the absence of evidence contradicting Employee’s 
testimony, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s 
conclusion, albeit implicit, that Employee was not terminated for cause.  See Tryon v. 
Saturn Corp., 254 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2008) (When the trial court has seen and 
heard witnesses, considerable deference must be afforded the trial court’s factual 
findings.).  As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order for temporary disability benefits 
from April 22, 2018, through May 9, 2018. 
                                                 
7 An assertion of fact in a party’s brief is not a substitute for evidence.  See Rezba v. Rezba, No. M2014-
00553-COA-R3-CV, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).  Likewise, 
arguments of counsel are not evidence.  Bullard v. Facilities Performance Grp., No. 2017-08-1053, 2018 
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 37, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2018). 
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Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the 
trial court’s decision finding Dr. Hutcheson to be a physician located in Employee’s 
community and awarding temporary disability benefits from April 22, 2018 to May 9, 
2018.  However, we hold that it was error for the trial court to order a panel of specialists 
and award temporary disability benefits on and after May 10, 2018.  Finally, we find that 
this appeal is not frivolous and deny Employee’s request for attorney’s fees.  
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
case is remanded.  Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal. 
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DAVID F. HENSLEY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
My colleagues misinterpret the statutes in issue, adopting a new legal term, “direct 
referral,” heretofore foreign to Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law and altering the 
decades-old privilege of an injured employee to select the treating physician from an 
employer-provided panel.  The majority applies subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii), enacted 
in part to shield employers from an employee directing an initial treating physician to 
refer him or her to a particular specialist, as a sword to nullify an employee’s statutory 
right to select from a panel any treating physician other than the initial treating physician.  
The majority’s interpretation runs counter to subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) and is 
inconsistent with section 50-6-116’s mandate to construe the workers’ compensation 
statutes fairly and impartially.  For those reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s holding that only an initial panel need be provided by an employer. 
 
Section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A) does not limit an injured employee’s right to select the 
treating physician to the initial provider with whom the injured employee treats.  Had that 
been the legislature’s intention, it would have been a simple matter to state so.  The 
majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with the expressed right of an injured worker to 
select the treating physician from a panel as set out in subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i), 
and it effectively eliminates an injured employee’s statutory right to select the treating 
physician from a panel in any claim requiring treatment beyond what a primary care 
physician can provide.  A brief overview of the history of an injured worker’s right to 
select the treating physician is appropriate. 
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As originally enacted in 1919, the provision of the Tennessee Workers’ 
Compensation Act obligating an employer to provide an injured worker “such medical 
and surgical treatment . . . as may be reasonably required” was interpreted as allowing the 
employer, in the first instance, to select the physician to provide the medical care that the 
injured worker was obligated to accept.  Irwin v. Fulton Sylphon Co., 166 S.W.2d 610, 
611 (Tenn. 1942).  Based on the statute’s requirement that the employer furnish the 
medical care free of charge, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded in 1942 that it 
“rather clearly appears to be the intent of the statute that the employer is to select a 
physician.”  Id.  The rationale was that the employer “could not very well furnish a 
physician or provide a physician without first choosing the physician.”  Id. 
 
In the year following the Irwin decision, a monumental change in the process of 
selecting the treating physician became law when the statute obligating an employer to 
provide medical care to an injured worker was amended to require the employer to 
“designate a group of three or more reputable physicians or surgeons if available in that 
community from which the injured employee shall have the privilege of selecting the 
operating surgeon or attending physician.”  1943 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 117, § 1 (emphasis 
added).  This provision remained unchanged until 1967 when it was amended to require 
that the physicians or surgeons on the employer-provided panel not be “associated 
together in practice.”1  Almost twenty years later, the statute was further amended to 
provide that the “listing of physicians or surgeons may include doctors of chiropractic 
within the scope of their licenses.”2  Thereafter, the statute remained largely unchanged 
until the 2013 Reform Act, except for amendments in 2000 and 2001. 
 
In 2000, the panel of physicians was expanded to four physicians, one of whom 
had to be a doctor of chiropractic, if the injury was a back injury.3  In 2001 the statute 
was amended to add a new subsection providing that “[i]f the injury or illness requires 
treatment of a physician or surgeon who practices orthopedic or neuroscience medicine,” 
the employer “may” appoint a panel of physicians or surgeons practicing orthopedic or 
neuroscience medicine “consisting of five (5) physicians, with no more than four (4) 
physicians affiliated in practice.”  2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 246, § 1.  This amendment 
further provided that in circumstances where an injured employee is offered a “treating 
panel” consisting of five physicians as provided in the amendment, “the injured employee 
shall be entitled to have a second opinion on the issue of surgery, impairment, and a 
                                                 
1 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 113, § 3. 
 
2 1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 782, § 1. 
 
3 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 990, § 1 added the requirement that the panel of physicians be expanded to 
four, one of whom must be a chiropractor, where the injury was a “back injury.”  The amendment 
additionally provided that “no more than twelve (12) visits to such doctor of chiropractic shall be 
approved per back injury.” 
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diagnosis from that same panel of physicians selected by the employer.”  Id.  (emphasis 
added). 
 
Although other amendments prior to the 2013 Reform Act modified section 50-6-
204 (and its predecessors) to extend the time period during which an employer was 
responsible for providing medical benefits or to increase the monetary limit of the 
medical expenses for which an employer might be liable, these amendments, with the 
exception of a 2008 amendment, did not impact physician panels.  However, by replacing 
“operating surgeon or attending physician” with “operating surgeon and attending 
physician,” a 2008 amendment made it clear that the injured employee’s privilege of 
selection applied both to the operating surgeon and the attending physician.4 
 
Thus, immediately prior to the effective date of the 2013 Reform Act, section 50-
6-204(a)(4)(A) obligated an injured employee to accept the medical benefits afforded in 
that section, provided that, with the exceptions of an injury that “is a back injury” or an 
injury requiring “the treatment of a physician or surgeon who practices orthopedic or 
neuroscience medicine,” the employer designated “a group of three (3) or more reputable 
physicians or surgeons not associated together in practice, if available in that community, 
from which the injured employee shall have the privilege of selecting the operating 
surgeon and the attending physician.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(4)(A) (2013) 
(emphasis added).  If the injury was a back injury, the statute required the group of three 
or more physicians or surgeons to be “expanded to four (4), one (1) of whom must be a 
doctor of chiropractic.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(4)(B) (2013).  In addition, if the 
injury required “treatment of a physician or surgeon who practices orthopedic or 
neuroscience medicine,” the employer was authorized, but not required, to “appoint a 
panel of physicians or surgeons practicing orthopedic or neuroscience 
medicine . . . consisting of five (5) physicians, with no more than four (4) physicians 
affiliated in practice.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(4)(C) (2013). 
 
Against this background, and as part of the substantial reforms enacted in 2013, 
many of the provisions of section 50-6-204 regarding medical treatment were modified.  
The obligation of an injured employee to “accept the medical benefits afforded under this 
section” continued where “the employee has suffered an injury and expressed a need for 
medical care.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018).  In the event of an injury 
and the employee’s expression of a need for medical care, the employer is obligated to 
“designate a group of three or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons, 
chiropractors or specialty practice groups . . . from which the injured employee shall 
select one (1) to be the treating physician.”  Id.  Clearly, and consistent with the 
procedure originally enacted in 1943, the intention evident from the plain language of 
section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) of the 2013 Reform Act is that an injured employee have the 
right to select the “treating physician” from a panel.  The obligation imposed upon 
                                                 
4 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 835, § 1. 
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employers by section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) was not limited to providing panels of primary 
care providers; rather, it extended to “surgeons . . . or specialty practice groups” from 
which the injured employee is required to select “one (1) to be the treating physician.”  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 
In the following subsection, subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii), the legislature 
addressed referrals.  “When necessary, the treating physician . . . shall make referrals to a 
specialist physician, surgeon, or chiropractor and immediately notify the employer.”  
Employers who responded timely to a treating physician’s referral to a specialist were no 
longer at risk of an employee directing the specialist to whom he or she would be 
referred.  Where a referral was made, “[t]he employer shall be deemed to have accepted 
the referral, unless the employer, within three (3) business days, provides the employee a 
panel of three (3) or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons, chiropractors or 
specialty practice groups.”  Id.  If the employer timely provides such a panel, “the 
employee may choose a specialist . . . only from the panel provided by the employer.”  Id. 
 
  Importantly, subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(E) provides that “[i]n all cases where the 
treating physician has referred the employee to a specialist physician, surgeon, 
chiropractor or specialty practice group, the specialist physician, surgeon, or chiropractor 
to which the employee has been referred, or selected by the employee from a panel 
provided by the employer, shall become the treating physician until treatment by the 
specialty physician, surgeon, or chiropractor concludes and the employee has been 
referred back to the treating physician selected by the employee from the initial 
panel . . . .”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(E) (emphasis added).  By the plain 
language of this statute, when it is necessary for the treating physician to refer the injured 
employee to a specialist for treatment, the specialist “shall become the treating 
physician . . . . ”  Id.  The statute contemplates that the “specialist” becomes the treating 
physician, yet the majority’s conclusion is that unless the employer timely provides a 
panel of specialists, the employee’s right to select the treating physician from a panel, 
which is expressly provided in section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i), is lost due to the employer 
being “deemed to have accepted the referral.” 
 
The majority has taken the shield provided by subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii) 
that is intended to both (1) deter an employer from delaying an employee’s treatment 
with a specialist and (2) protect an employer from an employee directing the initial 
treating provider to make a specific referral, to effectively allow an employer to designate 
the specialist physician by instructing the initial panel physician to make referrals to a 
particular specialist.  The effect is to usurp the plain language of section 50-6-
204(a)(3)(A)(i) in any case in which a referral to a specialist becomes necessary.  How 
can it be said that these two subdivisions, the predecessor of which expressly granted an 
injured employee the privilege of selecting the operating surgeon and attending physician 
from a panel, express an intention to limit an injured employee’s right to select the 
treating physician to the initial provider chosen from a panel?  The term “privilege” is no 
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longer in the statute, and “the operating surgeon and the attending physician” have been 
replaced with “the treating physician.”  However, nothing in either subsection evidences 
an intention to limit an injured employee’s right to select the treating physician to an 
initial panel or to remove the employee’s right to select the treating physician from a 
panel in the event of a referral to a specialist.  Irrespective of the absence of any 
expression of such intention, the majority has adopted a new legal term “direct referral” 
that materially alters the rights and obligations of employers and injured employees.5  
Any number of phrases could have been used to accomplish this end had the legislature 
intended the result reached by the majority to limit an injured employee’s right to select a 
treating physician to the initial provider. 
 
 It would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have stated that both “the 
employer and the employee shall be deemed to have accepted the referral” had that been 
its intention.  The legislature could have provided that the physician “to whom the injured 
employee is referred shall become the treating physician unless the employer, within 
three business days, provides the employee a panel,” had the legislature’s intention been 
to limit the employee’s right of selection to an initial panel.   Subsection 204(a)(3)(A)(ii) 
in no manner indicates that an injured employee loses the right to select the treating 
physician from a panel where the employer accepts or is “deemed” to have accepted the 
referral.  Similarly, it would have been a simple matter to clarify that an employer’s 
obligation to designate a panel was limited to the “initial” treating physician, had that 
been the legislature’s intention.  Instead, subsection 50-6-204(a)(3)(E) makes it clear that 
the specialist “shall become the treating physician until treatment by the specialist 
physician . . . concludes and the employee has been referred back to the treating 
physician selected by the employee from the initial panel . . . .”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
204(a)(3)(E) (emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, the language the majority construes to limit an injured employee’s 
selection of the treating physician to an initial panel includes no words to that effect.  The 
majority relies on an inference from the clause providing that the employer who does not 
timely provide a panel “shall be deemed to have accepted the referral.”  What does it 
mean for an employer to be deemed to have “accepted” a referral in the context of this 
subsection?  Merriam-Webster defines “accepted” to mean “regarded favorably: given 
approval or acceptance.”6  In the context of these statutes, to be deemed to have 
“accepted” the referral clearly means to be deemed to have authorized the referral.  Thus, 
the majority’s inference is that the employer’s acceptance, authorization, or approval of a 
treating physician’s referral terminates the right of an injured employee to select the 
                                                 
5 The Appeals Board first addressed the term “direct referral” in a 2017 interlocutory appeal, noting that 
the employer in the case “chose to describe subsection 204(a)(3)(A)(ii) as the ‘direct referral statute,’ 
although that phrase does not appear in the statute itself.”  Tapley v. Transport Nat’l., No. 2016-05-1050, 
2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 64, at *7 n.2 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 19, 2017). 
 
6 https://www.merrian-webster.com/dictionary/accepted (last visited June 10, 2019). 
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treating specialist from a panel if the employer fails to timely provide a panel of 
specialists.  In my opinion, the majority’s inference is tenuous at best. 
 
If the inference is premised on pre-reform law expressed in the seventy-five years 
since injured workers gained the statutory right to select the treating physician from a 
panel, neither the appellant nor my colleagues has identified such authority.  My research 
indicates that, under the workers’ compensation law prior to the 2013 Reform Act, an 
employer’s failure to give an injured employee the opportunity to choose the ultimate 
treating physician from a panel results in a risk of the employer having to pay the 
reasonable cost for treatment of the employee’s injuries by a physician of the employee’s 
choice.  See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morgan, 795 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 
1990) (“Where the employer fails to give the employee the opportunity to choose the 
ultimate treating physician from a panel of at least three physicians, [it] runs the risk of 
having to pay the reasonable cost for treatment of the employee’s injuries by a physician 
of the employee’s choice.”  (Emphasis added.)). 
 
An injured worker’s statutory right to select the ultimate treating physician from 
an employer-provided panel is an important and valuable benefit.  In my opinion, neither 
the statutes in question nor prior judicial opinions express an intention to limit an injured 
employee’s statutory right to select the treating physician from a panel to the initial 
medical provider.  “Courts must adopt the most reasonable construction which avoids 
statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws.”  Johnson v. 
Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted).  Not 
only is it reasonable to adopt a construction of these statutes that avoids conflict between 
subsections 204(a)(3)(A)(i), (ii), and (a)(3)(E), but the construction I urge maintains an 
injured employee’s decades-old statutory right to select the treating physician from a 
panel and provides for harmonious operation of these statutes. 
 
 Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation clears the way for an employer or 
insurer to unilaterally select the treating physician in any claim where a referral to a 
specialist physician or surgeon becomes necessary.  While this allows employers and 
insurers significantly greater control over the medical care, it effectively returns the 
medical provider selection process to the pre-1943 procedure in any case requiring 
treatment by a specialty physician.  The facts in the instant case provide an example. 
 
Here, Mr. Rhodes selected American Family Care, a walk-in medical clinic, from 
an employer-provided panel where he was seen by Dr. Natasha Ballard, a primary care 
physician.  Dr. Ballard testified she referred Mr. Rhodes to Dr. Ricky Hutcheson.  Asked 
specifically why she referred him to Dr. Hutcheson, she testified that since “they” had 
gotten the Amazon account “we were just told that, you know, for orthopedic we prefer 
Dr. Hutcheson.”  She testified “[i]t just depends on the employer.  Even though we are a 
panel state, it depends on the employer and particularly their preference.  Some 
employers or case managers prefer certain physicians over others.”  She testified that 
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“[t]ypically, we do that [make a referral to a specific physician] just to help speed up the 
process, so [employees] can get in to see someone sooner,” but when asked, “[i]s there 
any medical reason why you made a specific referral to Dr. Hutcheson,” she said, 
“[m]edically, no. . . . It was just – Amazon would just prefer to send [its employees] to 
Dr. Hutcheson.”  She was asked whether anyone told her “you have to provide referrals 
to Dr. Hutcheson,” and she responded, “[t]hat was told to us by Michael Schock when we 
first started the account. . . . When we first got that, he had given us something that they 
wanted referrals to Dr. Hutcheson.  So we’ve just kept that going ever since to him.”  Dr. 
Ballard further testified that if Mr. Rhodes was not employed by Amazon, she would not 
have referred him to Dr. Hutcheson. 
 
The majority’s interpretation of these statutes replaces the statutory right of an 
injured employee to select the ultimate treating physician from an employer-provided 
panel in favor of additional control by employers and insurers over the specific providers 
who serve as treating physicians.  In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation does not 
construe the statutes fairly and impartially as mandated by section 50-6-116; rather, the 
interpretation unfairly favors employers and insurers over injured workers.  As in this 
case, initial panels that are provided to injured workers are frequently limited to walk-in 
or primary care medical clinics staffed by family nurse practitioners or primary care 
physicians.  The effect of the majority’s interpretation is to tacitly approve arrangements 
between employers and/or insurers with the medical providers included on initial panels, 
whereby referrals can be limited to specialists chosen by the employer and/or insurer, as 
occurred here.  In my opinion, such arrangements effectively negate the express provision 
allowing an injured employee to select the treating physician from a panel as provided in 
section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 
   In conclusion, I agree with the trial court’s determination that Amazon essentially 
directed Mr. Rhodes to a single specialist, resulting in a usurpation of Mr. Rhodes’ 
statutory right to select the treating physician from a panel.  I would affirm the trial 
court’s order that Amazon provide Mr. Rhodes a panel of orthopedists in his community 
for such treatment as is reasonably necessary for his alleged work injury, and I would 
affirm the trial court’s award of temporary partial disability benefits.  Because I disagree 
with the majority’s conclusion that the referral to Dr. Hutcheson was appropriate, I do 
not address the issues of whether Dr. Hutcheson is within Mr. Rhodes’ community or 
whether his refusal to attend an appointment with Dr. Hutcheson amounted to 
noncompliance with medical treatment.  I concur in the majority’s determination that this 
appeal is not frivolous.      
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